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Abstract 
 
The article analyses the sources of local actors’ legitimacy perceptions towards international 
peacebuilding operations. Local legitimacy perceptions are increasingly recognised as 
shaping local behaviour towards international peacebuilding, which influences the effective 
functioning of the operation. Legitimacy debates in peacebuilding are either absent or 
imported from the literature on domestic legitimacy, without respect to the specific temporal 
and spatial situation of international operations. The article first explores which legitimacy 
sources influence local legitimacy perceptions of international peacebuilding operations. It 
finds that two sources are relevant: output and procedure. Second, it investigates how exactly 
legitimacy arises from them. In doing so it demonstrates that output and procedure are 
umbrella terms comprising several sub-elements which influence legitimacy in different, 
sometimes contradictory, ways. Finally, the article empirically explores which of the sources 
are important to local actors’ legitimacy perceptions using field data from the EU 
peacebuilding operations EULEX in Kosovo and EUPM Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Introduction 
The significance of legitimacy in international interventions and peace operations has 
received increasing recognition in recent years. Contributions have highlighted the 
importance of the concept for winning local support and acceptance of a mission (Mersiades, 
2005; Gow and Dandeker 1995), and fostering compliance with and efficiency of 
international efforts (Gippert, 2015; Whalan, 2013). International donors and policy-makers 
have similarly included perceptions of legitimacy into their guidelines and policies 
(Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008; DFID, 2012; OECD-DAC, 2010). Despite 
its clear importance for international peacebuilding, we know very little about how 
legitimacy is engendered, as the debate is often absent or derived wholesale from the 
literature on domestic legitimacy. While the latter can provide valid insights, such a transfer 
has to be sensitive to the specific character of international operations– they are temporally 
limited but often powerful sources of authority for the local population (or elite) of the host 
state. Most traditional accounts of legitimacy theory are based on the state-citizen 
relationship, where the legitimacy of the state derives from the social contract with its 
citizens (Weber, 1978; Zelditch, 2001). This Rousseauian idea does not apply to international 
peace operations as they at best strike a deal with the host state government but not the 
population of the state. 
 This article illuminates how legitimacy arises in situations of international 
peacebuilding using the examples of two divided post-conflict societies, Kosovo and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Employing two case studies from the same region limits the generalizability of 
the findings but allows for in-depth micro-level analysis of what these two cases can tell us 
about the sources of legitimacy. The majority of the peacebuilding literature analyses 
legitimacy views of the international community (Coleman, 2007; Bellamy and Williams 
2005; Wiharta, 2009). This study, on the other hand, is interested in the perceptions of the 
local actors in the host state who work directly with the international operation. Local actors’ 
perceptions are important to international peace operations as these international reforms aim 
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at changing crucial elements of the political order of the state; the way its institutions are 
organised or run; and how citizens engage with the state. Such reforms go to the heart of the 
state-citizen relationship; they are in their essence meant to address the domestic legitimacy 
and trust deficit conflict can incur between the state and its inhabitants. Whether these 
reforms are accepted and considered legitimate by those who will end up living with them 
plays an important role in the effectiveness and sustainability of building peace. Legitimacy 
perceptions colour local actors’ actions in terms of cooperation, compliance, or resistance 
towards the international institutions tasked with building this peace. Perceptions therefore 
directly shape the permissibility of the environment in which the mission works and the 
chance of the reforms being implemented and becoming sustainable (Donais, 2009). On the 
operational level, the bulk of reforms are implemented through or with the substantial help of 
local actors, as both case study examples in this article show (Sending, 2011). Local 
legitimacy attitudes can therefore have an imminent effect on the feasibility and effectiveness 
of international reforms.   
 The insights of this article contribute to the nascent debates on the relevance of 
legitimacy and local actors' agency for international peacebuilding outcomes. First, the article 
explores which legitimacy sources can influence local legitimacy perceptions of international 
peacebuilding operations in light of their specific context. It finds that two sources are 
relevant to peacebuilding operations: output and procedure. Second, it investigates how 
exactly legitimacy arises from them. In doing so, it shows that output and procedure are 
umbrella terms, comprising several sub-elements which influence legitimacy in different 
ways. Finally, the article explores which sources are important to local actors’ legitimacy 
perceptions using empirical data from the EU peacebuilding operations EULEX in Kosovo 
and EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both operations were long-term intrusive examples of 
peacebuilding, and the analysis focuses on the legitimacy perceptions of the local police 
officers who worked directly with the operations in implementing EU police reforms. While 
this is an exploratory study, the comparative format of the article shows patterns of relevant 
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sources fuelling local legitimacy perceptions. The conclusion discusses the findings of this 
article with regards to the relevant literatures in peacebuilding and the implications of these 
findings for the wider IR and Political Science literatures on legitimacy.  
 
Sources of legitimacy for international peacebuilding operations 
In Weber’s understanding, legitimacy is a form of power that provides an internal, voluntary 
reason for an individual to accept the authority of an institution (Weber, 1978; Zelditch, 
2001). Legitimacy is a social phenomenon that depends on the individual or collective 
interaction between the rule-giver and the rule-recipient. In this interactive relationship an 
institution makes legitimacy claims which are either accepted or rejected by the audience to 
which they are addressed. These two sides of the dialogue constitute the elements of 
legitimacy: processes of legitimation and perceptions of legitimacy (Zaum, 2013). The 
processes of legitimation concern the ways in which an institution makes claims as to its own 
legitimacy, and the perceptions arise from the legitimacy judgements made by the audience 
towards the institution, on the basis of certain normative benchmarks. These benchmarks are 
individually and collectively held beliefs. Legitimacy is a matter of degree, not a binary 
variable. This article focuses on the second element, the local legitimacy perceptions vis-à-vis 
a peacebuilding operation. A society is not necessarily homogeneous in its desires for reform, 
and different communities may sport diverging or even contradictory views. This will be 
illustrated particularly in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the following empirical analysis. 
International peacebuilding operations constitute temporary institutions of authority to 
the local population and government without being elected or even appointed by any local 
authority. These specific features of international peacebuilding operations exclude (or 
curtail) some of the most important legitimacy sources discussed in the classical literature on 
legitimacy as part of the social contract between the state and the citizens: democratic consent 
to the exercise of authority, accountability to local laws, and judicial redress. International 
operations are not democratically elected by the population of the host state but deployed by 
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an international organisation. An international mission is held accountable by its parent 
organisation but it is not accountable to the government or population of the host state. 
Similarly, its staff is only answerable to its seconding government (Caplan, 2005) and the 
staff of these operations are immune from local prosecution (Rawski, 2003). Several missions 
have addressed these limitations of accountability and redress by setting up ombudsperson 
offices, however, these can only deliver advisory opinions.  
There is not much discussion in the literature on peacebuilding about how legitimacy 
of international peace operations is engendered. Whalan is a notable exception in that she 
differentiates between source legitimacy, substantive legitimacy, and procedural legitimacy 
as bases of local actors’ perceptions towards an international mission. These three she 
describes as legitimacy deriving from the operation’s source of authority (a UNSC mandate), 
its outcomes, and the way it exercises authority (Whalan, 2013).  Galtung and Eide in their 
work on Gaza identify several factors that improve local ‘acceptance’ of the operation. These 
include how the mission staff behave in public, including observing local cultural norms, and 
how they treat people (Galtung and Eide, 1976). Mersiades finds that legitimacy is 
engendered by the mission being decisive in its actions, particularly in providing security or 
other visible outcomes for the population (Mersiades, 2005). What these different 
contributions to the literature have in common is that legitimacy is seen to derive either from 
the way the operation treats local people and behaves in the exercise of their duty, or in terms 
of the outcomes it achieves.   
 
Procedural legitimacy 
Hurd discusses ‘correct procedure’ as engendering legitimacy through the ways in which an 
institution works, exercises its powers, and treats its relevant audience (Hurd, 2007). 
Similarly, Tyler finds that sometimes actors accept rulings or decisions and consider them 
legitimate even though they go against their interests (Tyler, 1990). He argues that this kind 
of legitimacy arises from people’s acceptance of the way a decision was made, their 
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recognition that it was fair, unbiased, and followed an accepted procedure. So procedural 
legitimacy arises when the exercise of authority matches the individual’s normative 
benchmarks about how such an exercise should work. Englebert and Tull show that imposing 
Western institutions on African ‘failed states’ often does not lead to these institutions being 
accepted by the local population because they represent a different administrative or legal 
tradition that local people cannot identify with – it does not match their normative 
benchmarks (2008).  
Despite the lack of a social contract, there are several important procedural legitimacy 
elements that can influence local legitimacy perceptions. The alternative to democratic 
elections, to justify the authority of an international operation, is to obtain the consent of the 
host government (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Gray, 1996). However, there are two issues 
with this form of consent. First, governmental consent raises questions in how far the 
government is representative of its population. This can be problematic if the government is 
not (yet) democratically elected or represents one of the conflict parties (Zaum, 2007). This 
was a problem for the UN mission in Cambodia as the Khmer Rouge did not support the 
mission (Doyle, 2001). Second, an international mission is often invited after conflict as part 
of a brokered peace deal. Local consent to the mission is hence not always freely given but 
forms part of a broader agreement. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the 
International Stabilization Force and the International Police Training Force were part of the 
same document that ended the war (GFAP, 1995).  
The way in which international operations, either collectively or its individual 
members of staff, treat the local population and their local partners can influence local 
legitimacy perceptions. An operation can legitimate itself towards local actors by making 
sure it treats locals equally and with respect. This includes applying the same standards for 
relations to all actors (including of different communities), taking local opinions and 
concerns on board, and being respectful while maintaining the impartial stance of the 
operation (if that is indeed enshrined in the mandate). Impartiality has become less of a 
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criterion for international operations with the advent of third-generation peacekeeping into 
which both case studies here fall. Indeed, in the case of Kosovo, impartiality is problematic 
for the Kosovo-Albanian population because it biases the operation against their avowed 
view; that Kosovo is an independent state. Finally, the professionalism and expertise of its 
staff are one of the most fundamental aspects of an international operation’s procedural 
legitimacy. They are considered an element of procedural legitimacy because the way the 
mission staff acts (professionally or unprofessionally) towards their local counterparts and 
whether they are experts in their fields crucially shapes the way the mission is seen to operate 
and conduct itself. It is linked to the above element of treating local actors respectfully and 
equally but more concerned with the professional image of the mission staff.  
 
Output legitimacy 
In his early work, Fritz Scharpf popularised the concept of output-oriented legitimacy which 
arises from the ends for which a system works. A political order is legitimate if it represents 
the idea of ‘government for the people’ (Scharpf, 1999). Although output legitimacy has 
become a buzzword in the legitimacy literature of late, it is often used synonymously with 
‘performance’, which either reduces the concept to the mere actions of an institution, or 
worse, to the material benefits individuals gain from it (Greven, 2000; Steffek, 2003). This is 
simplistic and undermines our ability to trace the ways in which legitimacy perceptions arise 
from output.  
Examples in Scharpf’s own work of which ‘outputs’ are expected of an institution 
include more abstract ideas such as ‘common good’ and very practical examples like social 
security and economic growth (Scharpf, 1975). From these latter examples it is easy to see 
why subsequent scholars have chosen such a narrow interpretation of output legitimacy, 
literally equating it with the outputs of an institution. However, personal gain can hardly be 
considered a legitimacy source, as it leads to compliance with rules only for instrumental 
reasons, not for internal ones (March and Olsen, 1989). Although it appears to be an abstract 
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notion, common good plays a crucial role in the concept of output legitimacy as it is the 
element linking materialistic outputs to legitimacy perceptions. Indeed, output-oriented 
legitimacy has two aspects: the match of the aims and objective of the international operation 
with the needs of the population; and the performance of the operation in achieving these 
aims and objectives.  
The question this raises is how an international operation can know what the common 
good for a host state is? In a domestic context policy-makers are part of the society they serve 
and it could be assumed, in belonging to the same community, they recognise the common 
good (Walzer, 1980). This, however, presupposes a unity of interest and identity which 
Scharpf himself admits is very problematic (Scharpf, 1999). In an international peacebuilding 
mission, the ‘policy-makers’ are not part of the host society. How can they know what the 
common good for the host-society entails? The problematic answer to this question is to 
assume a common interest between local wishes and international aims, reminiscent of Lord 
Lugard’s notion of the ‘dual mandate’ and its implied colonial attitude (Lugard, 1922; 
Ottaway, 2002). 
Scharpf himself provides the answer to this question: ‘Responsible governments must 
pursue the common good, but its substantive understanding, and the policies serving its 
attainment, should arise from deliberative interactions in the shared public space of the 
polity’ (Scharpf, 2009, p.20; Habermas, 1962). Such a communication overcomes the 
assumption of a common interest, as multiple and contradictory needs can be articulated. This 
is particularly significant in case of divided societies such as the two examples in this study, 
Kosovo and Bosnia. Given that post-conflict societies often have weak state structures, this 
‘deliberative interaction’ does not need to be led by the state (indeed, the aim behind many 
peacebuilding reforms is to build up such a ‘shared public space’ for inclusive interaction) 
but can have important input from non-state actors. In Kosovo, EULEX made a point of 
conferring with the Serb community in the Northern provinces, who refuse to interact with 
the Kosovo state institutions. Similarly, in Bosnia the ‘shared public space’ is as divided as 
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the state. Therefore, EUPM deliberated intensively with the leaders of each community. 
These examples show that Scharpf’s definition might be too neat for post-conflict states but 
the principle of it, consulting with the representatives of the population to understand their 
desires for reform, remains crucial even if the process differs. Once the substance of the 
common good is established, it has to be reflected in the actual policies of the international 
operation – its aims and outputs.1  
There are several elements of output legitimacy that can influence local legitimacy 
attitudes. The first element is the required congruence between mission reforms and local 
actors’ reform wishes. This congruence can be difficult to attain as the mandate of an 
international operation is usually a highly political document that is driven by the need for 
consensus in the deploying organisation rather than by the needs of the local population. 
Whalan shows how the international operation to the Solomon Islands, RAMSI, made a point 
of their senior staff meeting local people and consulting with them on what the mission 
should focus on (Whalan, 2013). 
The second significant element of output legitimacy is whether the norms and values 
the mission exports as part of its reforms are accepted by the local population. Depending on 
the sending organisation and the mandate of the operation, these norms often include respect 
for minorities, gender equality, rule of law, transparency, and accountability. For output 
legitimacy, it is important to understand whether these norms and values make sense in the 
local context and how they are accepted. On the example of rule of law reforms in East 
Timor, Hohe demonstrates how the imposition of international rule of law blue-prints, 
without regard to local traditional forms of justice undermined local legitimacy (Hohe, 2002). 
The final element of output legitimacy is the question of whether the mission achieves 
the reforms it sets out to introduce. The UN mission in Somalia for instance was unable to 
                                                          
1 This may be difficult in practice as different communities within society or former warring parties may 
fundamentally disagree on what they want the international operation to do.  
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deliver on its mandate because it did not manage to control the security situation (Mersiades, 
2005). 
 
Local legitimacy perceptions 
Based on these theoretical discussions, this part of the article explores the sources of 
legitimacy that were most relevant to the local police officers in Bosnia and Kosovo. The data 
for the analysis comes from face-to-face interviews conducted with local officers of all ranks 
in both countries. These interviews included open-ended questions2 asking the officers about 
their perceptions of the international operation, and a legitimacy survey that consisted of the 
seven items of procedural and output legitimacy discussed above. The survey provided a 
statement (see table 1 below) and respondents were asked to reply using a six-point answer 
key: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree (undecided), disagree, strongly 
disagree, do not know. To catch out respondents’ reply sets, one of the items was phrased in 
the negative. As elaborated in the following evaluation, retrospectively that was not a good 
idea as it confused respondents and biased the replies. Respondents were selected purposively 
for their proximity to the reform process, ensuring a balance of gender, region, rank, and 
ethnicity. In Kosovo 35 officers of ranks ranging from Officer to Colonel were interviewed. 
Of these officers seven were Serb, one Bosniak, one Turkish, and 26 Albanian. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina 36 officers were interviewed of which 13 were Bosniak, 12 were Croat, and 11 
were Serb. The interviews were either conducted in English or with the help of local 
translators. They usually took place in an office, a meeting room, or a café (usually when the 
coffee in the station was bad). 
 
Table 1 here 
                                                          
2 Open-ended questions from the interviews included: 1. What is your opinion of the international mission? 2. 
What do you feel are the most important issues the mission should work on? 3. How successful are they at 
tackling these issues? 4. How have the mission staff behaved towards you during your common work? 5. Do 
you feel the mission treats all their local partners equally? Officers were also encouraged to add explanations 
to their survey replies if they felt that to be necessary. 
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The survey data is disaggregated by ethnic group for each country. The judgement whether 
an element of either source was important for an officer’s legitimacy is based on two 
indicators: the strength of the response in the survey (strongly (dis)agree or (dis)agree rather 
than undecided or do not know) and the open-ended interview replies from the officer. In 
case of disagreement between these two indicators, the interview responses are considered 
authoritative because of the possibility that survey items were misunderstood whereas in the 
interview coherent answers had to be given, which reveal misunderstandings.  
 
European Union Police Mission Bosnia-Herzegovina 
International intervention in Bosnia started during the 1992-1995 war, which pitted the three 
main ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks) against each other in their different visions for 
Bosnia’s future after the break-up of Yugoslavia (Woodward, 1995). From the fairly toothless 
UNPROFOR humanitarian mission, international intervention was upgraded substantially in 
1994/95 in the form of US-led air-strikes against the Serb forces that finally brought all 
parties to the negotiating table (Holbrook, 1999). The international community had a massive 
impact on the future of the country as it presented the parties with a peace agreement that was 
at the same time the blueprint for a future Bosnian state: The General Framework Agreement 
for Peace (GFAP, 1995). It foresaw a considerable military presence to keep the peace and 
divided the country along ethnic lines into two entities, the Serb-majority Republika Srpska 
and the Bosniak-Croat Federation, enshrining ethnic division in the name of keeping the 
peace. To Serbs this division is the requirement for their community to live in a majority-
Bosniak country and a non-negotiable security guarantee. To the Bosniak population this 
division is a reminder of the methods of ethnic cleansing used during the war and stands in 
the way of a unified Bosnian state (Mühlmann, 2008). To demilitarise and vet the local 
police, which had committed some of the worst atrocities during the war, an International 
13 
Police Training Force (IPTF) with a strong mandate was deployed. IPTF restructured the 
Bosnian police forces and made them fit for civilian policing again. However, the divisions of 
the state were also mirrored in the structure of the police as Bosnia’s police system is 
decentralised with a total of 15 forces. 
The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was deployed in January 2003 to bring 
the Bosnian police forces closer to European standards. EUPM was not empowered to take 
executive action but relied on a cooperative mandate to monitor, mentor, and inspect the local 
police. In various configurations EUPM stayed in Bosnia until June 2012. This analysis 
focuses on the first mandate period of EUPM from January 2003 until December 2005. The 
mission developed 138 individual projects that were implemented through the co-location of 
mission staff with the middle and senior management of the Bosnian police across the entire 
country (EUPM, 2003).  
 
Local legitimacy sources for the Bosnian police. The Bosnian police forces in 2003 had 
already come a long way since the end of the war, in which they had played an active and 
brutal role (Collantes Celador, 2008). On paper at least, all officers had been vetted by IPTF 
to ensure they had no record of war crimes. However, considerable challenges for the police 
remained, key among them divisions along ethnic lines, which are shown below to be the 
main differentiating factor between the respondents’ replies to the EUPM legitimacy survey. 
Over 90% of all officers of the three main ethnic groups ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ 
that the values underlying EUPM’s reforms were important for Bosnia, the first output 
legitimacy element. The interviews confirmed this trend as officers explained that their job 
was ‘to be trusted by the community’ and that they had to respect values like transparency 
and accountability to gain this trust (Interviews with Bosnian Police, BiH, October 2013).  
This finding shows that although the values transposed by the mission are part of the standard 
intervention blue-print (rule of law, transparency, gender and minority equality) they are 
accepted as important by the local police. This is interesting as several peacebuilding scholars 
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note the negative impact a perceived ‘imposition’ of foreign values can have on local actors 
and the sustainability of reform (Lemay-Hebert, 2014; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; 
Hohe, 2002). However, as Bosnia is both geographically and in terms of historical linkages 
close to the EU, it may not be surprising that EUPM’s values and norms were accepted. 
The second output legitimacy element was the question whether EUPM’s reforms 
match the needs of the Bosnian police. 20% of all Serb officers ‘agreed’ with this statement 
but 80% ‘disagreed’. Of the Croat officers, 100% either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’, and of 
the Bosniak officers 82% ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’. The interviews with the Serb officers 
showed that many fundamentally disagreed with the reform priorities of EUPM, which 
focused on strengthening the state-level institutions of the police. This reform priority was 
seen as directly undermining the control the Republika Srpska has over its police (Mühlmann, 
2008). For the Bosniak officers the case was exactly the other way around as EUPM’s 
reforms to centralise the police resonated with their wish for a unified Bosnia. The Croat 
officers explained in the interviews that they supported EUPM’s efforts to professionalise the 
police because it meant better policing for their community but they also wanted to keep 
policing on the entity level (Interviews with Bosnian Police, BiH, October 2013). This output 
element was important to local legitimacy perceptions. For most Serb officers the mismatch 
of EUPM’s priorities and their own perceived needs undermined their legitimacy perceptions. 
But the mission’s reforms matched (at least some of) Bosniak and Croat reform aims and so 
this element supported their legitimacy views. This finding highlights the problematique 
mentioned in the theoretical discussion of output legitimacy that the interpretation of the 
common good can be disputed between different communities within a state.  
 The final output legitimacy element asks about the performance of the operation in 
achieving their reforms. 40% of the Serb officers surveyed ‘agreed’ that performance was 
good, 40% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, and 20% ‘disagreed’. This split comes from the 
fact that some officers explained that EUPM was making progress and they did not like that 
because they disagreed with the reforms. So for them the good performance actually 
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undermined their legitimacy views. The Bosniak and Croat officers overwhelmingly ‘agreed’ 
that EUPM’s progress was good. In the interviews these officers explained that EUPM’s 
performance was important to them because it showed they meant the reforms and did not 
just ‘hide behind words’ (Interviews with Bosnian Police, BiH, October 2013). This division 
demonstrates that even views of performance are influenced by the evaluation of what 
constitutes the common good element of output. This shows how interconnected the two 
output elements are.  
 The first procedural element asks whether EUPM took local views and priorities into 
account, so whether the mission was responsive. Nearly all Bosniak and Croat officers 
‘agreed’ with this statement but of the Serb officers 40% ‘agreed’, 40% were undecided, and 
20% ‘disagreed’. This item refers to the process of involvement and participation of local 
actors in determining the reform course of the international operation. Serb officers explained 
that they had had little to no possibility to voice their opinion on EUPM’s reforms, but that 
decisions ‘had been taken in Brussels’ (Interviews with Bosnian Police, BiH, October 2013). 
While this was certainly true (and not just for EUPM), this presented less of a problem for the 
Bosniak and Croat officers, not because they had felt included but because the reforms better 
mirrored their views. Therefore, this element was also relevant for influencing local 
legitimacy views, but in the case of Serb officers, it served to undermine legitimacy 
perceptions. These findings indicate a prioritisation of outcome over process in the sense that 
process seemed to matter less to respondents who agreed with the outcome of a reform.  
 The second procedural legitimacy element was the question of respect. This question 
was phrased in the negative, so asking whether officers thought that EUPM did not treat their 
partners with enough respect. 60% of Serb officers ‘agreed’ that EUPM did not treat them 
with enough respect, and 40% were undecided. The officers explained this with the often 
rough and coercive way that EUPM senior officers would treat Serb officers in the RS to 
make them comply with their reforms (Mühlmann, 2008). So these perceptions, which 
undermined Serb legitimacy attitudes, were based on the fact that EUPM showed their 
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coercive face in their dealings with the RS rather than take on board their concerns. For the 
Croat and Bosniak officers 100% and 95% ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that EUPM did not 
treat them with sufficient respect. However, these statements are contradicted by the 
interviews with these officers, in which almost all describe very good and respectful relations 
with EUPM staff. It is likely many officers misunderstood that the question was phrased in 
the negative- in hindsight not a good idea when conducting interviews either via a translator 
or in a language that is not the respondent’s mother tongue. Due to this, it is difficult to 
evaluate whether this element was relevant to local legitimacy perceptions. For the Serb 
officers, where the interviews match the survey results, it does seem to have undermined 
legitimacy perceptions. 
 The majority of all officers of the three groups ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that 
EUPM’s staff was professional and exhibited good standards of policing. In general, most 
officers, no matter how critical they were of the mission’s reforms, admitted that the staff 
were very professional and wanted to support the local police. This finding supports the 
theoretical discussion that suggests that professionalism of mission staff is an important 
indicator for the local police of how the mission as a whole conduct itself and wields its 
authority; it resembles the idea of leading by example which resonated with the local police.  
The final element was the question of whether the consent of the Bosnian government 
had been important for their views of the mission. All officers ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ 
with this statement except for 20% of Serbs who ‘disagreed’. These officers explained that to 
them the approval of the Republika Srpska mattered and not that of the Bosnian government. 
The finding reflects the weak nature of the Bosnian state compared to the strong entities. It 
also questions the assumption underlying host state consent that the state represents its people 
and can hence legitimately make decisions in their name. 
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European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 
Kosovo’s international presence was brought on the by the ethnic conflict that waged in the 
Serbian province between Kosovo-Albanians, Kosovo-Serbs, and the Serbian army. After 
years of oppression of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo by the Serbian government, 
the militant Albanian group, the Kosovo Liberation Army, retaliated. This provoked large-
scale Serb army involvement in Kosovo from 1998 onwards, leading to ethnic cleansing and 
wide-spread violence against the Albanian community. NATO intervened with air-strikes in 
March 1999 and Kosovo became an international ward, administered by the United Nations 
Administration Mission (UNMIK) as of June 1999. After nine years of international 
administration, the international presence was reduced, following Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in 2008.  
The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo was envisioned to take over from UNMIK 
and support Kosovo’s rule of law institutions without recognising Kosovo’s independence. 
This compromise deal was required to obtain Serbia’s and Russia’s support for the mission. 
The mandate was split between monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA) the relevant 
institutions of the rule of law and a limited executive mandate (Council of the European 
Union, 2008, articles 3 (a &d)). The bulk of the reform work (and staff) fell under the 
cooperative MMA approach in which EULEX experts were co-located with their local 
counterparts (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005). EULEX is still operating in Kosovo and has 
undergone multiple restructuring phases. This article focuses on the initial reform work 
between 2008 and 2012.  
 
Local legitimacy sources for the Kosovo police. The Kosovo Police was created from scratch 
after the conflict and trained to a fairly high standard in the OSCE-run police school. It is the 
most-highly regarded rule of law institution in Kosovo and the only one that managed to 
integrate different minority groups, including Serb officers, as the divisions between Serb and 
Albanian people still run deep in society (Bennett, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2010; 
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Saferworld, 2012). The Kosovo Police is one centralised force and the only state institution 
that operates in the northern, Serb-majority, provinces, which do not recognise the authority 
of the government in Pristina. Despite the mission’s official stance of not recognising 
Kosovo’s independence, much of the Kosovo-Serb population refuse to deal with EULEX as 
they still see it as unofficially supporting the government in Pristina. As the below empirical 
analysis shows, these divisions on ethnic grounds as to Kosovo’s status are surprisingly not 
mirrored in the ethnically-mixed Kosovo Police. The Kosovo Police seems to have been quite 
successful in fostering a professional esprit de corps that binds the two ethnic groups 
together. 
 The elements asking for whether the reforms matched the perceived needs of the 
Kosovo police and whether the values of the reforms were considered important for Kosovo 
had both high rates of (strong) agreement (82% and 96% respectively). On the question of the 
match of reforms and needs some interview respondents explained that EULEX’s reforms 
had been good and useful in the beginning but that due to the development of the Kosovo 
police some were now outdated. But the vast majority of Serb and Albanian respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed that EULEX’ reforms matched local needs and that the values 
underlying the reforms were locally accepted. These two elements were important for all 
officers and served to support legitimacy perceptions. Both elements show that despite ethnic 
divisions in society these are not reflected in the police officers’ evaluations of the common 
good of EULEX’ reforms. This demonstrates that Scharpf’s congruence element can apply 
even in divided societies, contrary to the findings in Bosnia, if they agree on what the 
common good entails- in Kosovo the need for an unbiased rule of law.  
The performance element of output legitimacy was sub-divided to ask for the 
executive and non-executive police reforms separately. The performance of EULEX in the 
non-executive police reforms was evaluated quite positively, 78% ‘agreed’ that results were 
good and 14% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’. The interviews support this trend as most 
officers stated they were happy with the performance of the mission in this reform area. In 
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the field of executive performance on the other hand, so where EULEX was in charge of 
conducting investigations, replies were more mixed. Only 5% stated they ‘strongly agreed’ 
with the statement that the mission’s performance in the executive field was good, 36% 
‘agreed’ whereas 50% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’ and 9% ‘disagreed’. The interviews 
illustrate that this lack of satisfaction with EULEX was due to the strong statements the 
mission had made in the beginning of their mandate, promising to ‘catch big fish’ and end 
high-level corruption. The officers wondered why this promise had not been upheld as 
EULEX’s results have been modest to date. So while the element of performance was 
important for fostering local perceptions, its executive part served to undermine rather than 
bolster local legitimacy perceptions. This finding shows that the limited progress in achieving 
their stated aims undermined local legitimacy perceptions of EULEX.  
 The first procedural element asks whether EULEX took local priorities and opinions 
into account. Overall 73% ‘agreed’ with this statement, but 17% of Albanian officers were 
undecided and another 17% ‘disagreed’. They specifically questioned why 1200 of EULEX’s 
1950 staff were dedicated to police reform when the ‘real problem’ was the judiciary 
(Interviews with Kosovo Police, Kosovo, May 2013). Feeling that the mission’s priorities 
might reflect Brussels’ interests (a strong police to fight human and drug trafficking) more 
than local interests weakened legitimacy perceptions. This finding refers back to the 
theoretical discussion about the dilemma that operations’ mandates are political documents 
meant to facilitate international agreement (and strategic aims), rather than to reflect local 
wishes.  
 The second procedural legitimacy element asks whether the mission staff treated their 
local counterparts with sufficient respect. The replies to the survey were mixed but 
unfortunately that seems to be because of the way the question was asked (in negative form). 
The interviews indicate that most officers were satisfied with the respect the mission staff 
showed them, but all did stress how important they thought this was. Many of the 
interviewees supported this by contrasting it with the way UNMIK police had treated them, 
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which was described as quite condescending (Interview with Kosovo Police, Kosovo, April 
2012, May 2013). This finding reflects the agreement in the procedural legitimacy literature 
on the importance of treating actors fairly and with respect.  
The third procedural element, whether EULEX staff were professional and experts in 
their field, received strong support: 87% ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with the statement. The 
interviews also showed that EULEX police were considered very professional in terms of 
knowledge and expertise. Again this was contrasted with the staff of UNMIK, especially 
those who were described as coming from countries ‘that have no rule of law’ themselves and 
who were not considered to be able to advise the Kosovo Police (Interview with Kosovo 
Police, Kosovo, April 2012, May 2013). The fact that EULEX was predominately made up of 
EU member state police officers was seen as very positive. Like the findings from the 
Bosnian case, these show the importance of good staff conduct for the overall perceptions of 
how the mission comported itself vis-à-vis their local partners.  
 The final procedural legitimacy element asks whether host state consent was 
important to officers’ views of the mission. Replies on this item were quite evenly split 
between 45% ‘(strongly) agreeing’ and 32% ‘(strongly) disagreeing’. This split was even 
clearer for the Serb officers of whom 50% ‘(strongly) agreed’ and 50% ‘(strongly) 
disagreed’. In the interviews officers from both communities explained that to them the 
invitation of the Kosovo Assembly was important because it gave EULEX a local seal of 
approval. But equally, many officers stated that governmental consent did not matter to them 
because they did not hold very high opinions of the government (Interviews with Kosovo 
Police, Kosovo, April 2012, May 2013). So this element only played a relevant role for some 
officers’ legitimacy perceptions and also questions whether the government really does 
represent its citizens. 
  
Comparative assessment 
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The findings show that each source is an umbrella term which requires unpacking into its 
specific parts. In both cases the relevance of individual legitimacy sub-elements for officers’ 
legitimacy views varied between respondents, as did whether these elements supported or 
undermined legitimacy perceptions. This shows that simply differentiating between output 
and procedure is not helpful in understanding where local legitimacy perceptions come from 
but that we need to look into their sub-elements to understand whether and how they 
influence the sum of legitimacy perceptions.  
 The match of local needs and the mission’s priorities were very political and 
contentious issues in Bosnia that reflected a deeper disagreement between the three main 
ethnic groups’ visions of Bosnia’s future as a unified state or a weak decentralised bridge 
holding two strong entities. In Kosovo, this match was perceived as less of a problem as the 
mandate reflected both communities’ local priorities (strengthening the rule of law), although 
many officers were critical of the mission’s focus on police reform rather than the judiciary. 
Neither society saw the values underlying the reforms as unfit for the local context; an 
important finding as it speaks to debates in peacebuilding about acceptance and rejection of 
values and norms underlying reforms (Hohe, 2002; Kappler, 2013; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013).  
The element of performance was stressed as very important for most officers in their 
interviews. In Kosovo, performance was relevant but whether it served to support or 
undermine legitimacy perceptions depended the mission’s achievements, especially in the 
executive field. In Bosnia, performance views were dependent on whether the reforms of the 
mission were the ‘right ones’ for each community. For the Serb community good 
performance in centralising the police still undermined legitimacy perceptions because they 
disagreed with the reform as such. Both cases show the close link between performance and 
the common good element of output. Bosnia demonstrates how divisions in the latter 
element’s interpretation within a state can lead to such contrary performance views as found 
between Serb and Bosniak officers. 
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Host state consent in both states reflected the difficulties discussed in the first part of 
the article with regards to the government not being considered representative of the people. 
This shows that this element, heralded as key in the literatures, has to be analysed very 
carefully and in the local context to understand its impact on legitimacy perceptions. The 
procedural element of responsiveness in Bosnia was linked to agreement with the mission’s 
reforms. So officers who supported these reforms, indicated that they agreed with the mission 
being responsive, whereas officers who disagreed with the mission’s reforms stated they were 
not satisfied with the degree of responsiveness. Serb officers did not feel that EUPM had 
been responsive to their fears of the consequences of centralising the police forces as, despite 
some interaction, EUPM’s aims had not changed. The, in their view, bad outcome was seen 
as the result of lacking responsiveness. In the case of the Bosniak officers, the question of 
responsiveness was less important because the outcome, centralisation reforms, were seen as 
matching their local aims.  
  
Conclusion 
The findings of this study contribute new insights into several debates of international 
peacebuilding and legitimacy theory as well as explicitly introduce a debate on the sources of 
legitimacy, so far absent from the literature. First, the finding that Bosniak officers were 
unconcerned with limited consultation by EUPM as long as the outcome was what they 
wanted, seemed to indicate a prioritisation of outcome over procedure. At closer examination 
though, this finding rather seems to show a blurring of the two sources. The congruence 
element of output, so whether the mission’s reforms mirror local needs, includes a procedural 
aspect. While the common good can be seen as an output aspect (directing performance), the 
way to its attainment, the ‘deliberative interaction’, is also procedural. In the case of Bosnia, 
the Bosniak officers were more concerned with the output aspect of the common good, 
whether the mission’s reforms matched their wishes regarding police centralisation reforms. 
The Serb officers on the other hand, were concerned with the ‘deliberative interaction’, which 
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is meant to precede agreement on the common good, precisely because they saw this process 
as being at fault for not reaching agreement on the common good- the police centralisation 
reforms.  
This seems to suggest that the neat conceptual differentiation between output and 
procedure used in the literature and in this article does not hold up entirely in practice. While 
it is unsurprising that the messy real world does not adhere to clean analytical 
differentiations, it is interesting to note that we find a similar blurring between the two 
sources in legitimacy theory. An authority is seen as legitimate for exercising its power in a 
way that is considered to match the specific benchmarks of the society it represents. 
However, the reason people accept that there is an authority higher than themselves in the 
first place is because they feel it can overcome collective action problems. This thought 
underlies social contract theory and suggests a similar connection between outcome and 
procedure as the empirical analysis showed in Bosnia. This does not invalidate the utility of 
analytically separating the two concepts, as they do fundamentally work via different 
mechanisms. However, it does suggest that in practice these mechanisms can be connected or 
blur. While the empirical findings of this study are bounded, the theoretical implications may 
have wider relevance and require further research. 
 Second, much of the statebuilding literature links the performance of international 
efforts to its legitimacy following the argument made by Scharpf that if the operation is 
working for the good of the local people, it will be seen as legitimate (1999). The evidence 
for the effect of performance on legitimacy views is contradictory, suggesting a more 
complex relationship. The findings of this article indicate that one reason for the 
contradictory relationship is that performance evaluations are dependent on the prior analysis 
of the congruence of local aims and the mission’s reforms. This suggests that the evaluation 
of whether the reforms constitute the common good for the country (or the view a community 
has of the common good) pre-determine whether good progress on them serves to support or 
undermine legitimacy. This indication is important for the wider legitimacy literature as it 
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suggests not only that output cannot be reduced to performance, but that performance on the 
wrong reforms can actually be counterproductive and undermine legitimacy perceptions. This 
reveals the focus on performance in peacebuilding as simplistic and shows the need for 
considerate local-level analysis to inform reform priorities – so the contrary to how mission 
mandates are written in practice.  
Third, the findings of this article show that host state consent is not a straightforward 
legitimacy basis despite the importance it is accorded in the literature (Bellamy and Williams, 
2005; Gray, 1996; Wiharta, 2009). Although host state consent may be the best alternative to 
democratic consent in theory, it makes the assumption that the government of a state 
represents its citizens. Both Kosovo and Bosnia show that in post-conflict states (and in many 
others) this assumption does not always hold. Host state consent therefore fails to legitimise 
the intervention when the government itself is not considered legitimate to extend an 
invitation on behalf of its society (or communities within it).  
The findings and analysis of this article show the need for contextualised micro-level 
analysis of questions of local legitimacy. Macro-level analysis conceals important subtle 
distinctions, such as the contradictory influence performance can have on legitimacy views, 
which ultimately serves to show that legitimacy is indeed more than the sum of its parts.  
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